2004
Volume 100, Issue 1
  • ISSN: 0025-9454
  • E-ISSN: 1876-2816

Abstract

Abstract

This study examines whether people who believe they belong to a lower social class are more inclined to vote for right-wing populist parties (RPPs). Using DPES (NKO) data from 2021, the results of linear regression models show this is indeed the case. This is in line with social marginalization theory, which states that both economic and cultural developments are related to feelings of social marginalization, as proxied by subjective social class, rather than more objective measures. These feelings are likely induced by the populist frame of the good people versus the corrupt elite. What is more, and supporting the winners and losers of globalization hypothesis, people who say they belong to lower social classes are sensitive to RPPs proposed nativist and anti-globalization policies, as the relation between subjective social class and RPP voting is fully explained by a backlash against globalization, which includes anti-immigrant sentiments. A unique contribution of the current study is the incorporation of anti-inequality attitudes, demonstrating that being against income inequality is a prerequisite for people who place themselves in lower social classes to hold anti-globalization attitudes. They are merely relatively disadvantaged because of globalization, not absolutely. As a result of this relative disadvantage, it is especially the inequality due to globalization that is problematic. By explicitly theorizing, testing, and showing the modifying influence of anti-inequality attitudes, this study contributes to the vast literature on support for RPPs.

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