oa De sterkte van voorkeuren en de kritiek van principes. Hare over normatieve argumentatie

In the light of Hare’s argument in his latest book on Moral Thinking we might deal with two fundamental questions concerning normative reasoning: (1) What precisely is the content of a utilitarian criterion of moral rightness, i.e. what does it mean to say of an action that it results in an ‘equal amount of happiness’ or in ‘more happiness’ than another action? (2) How should a utilitarian criterion be used in a process of deliberation, i.e. in choosing between alternative courses of action, what procedure should we follow to reach a decision by means of a utilitarian criterion of moral rightness?

Hare’s answers to these questions are critically discussed, including his views on the satisfaction of preferences and the indirect use of the criterion as well as his requirement of prudence and his claim that it is not a philosophical question when to engage in critical thinking.