NTT Journal for Theology and the Study of Religion - Volume 56, Issue 2, 2002

This article deals with the most influential conceptions of the second half of the twentieth century concerning the flight to Pella. Was this journey of Christians, who fled from Jerusalem because of its devastation, a historical event? Why would the Church of Jerusalem move to Pella? The pros and cons put forward by several scholars are discussed. Finally, an attempt is made to trace the source of this tradition.

It is often suggested in recent philosophical discussions on the problem of hell that an analogy exists between the specific problem of hell and the more general problem of evil. Hell, it is said, constitutes an evil, and like other instances of evil, raises the question of how an omnipotent and perfectly good God can allow it. In this article the author queries what exactly it means to speak of hell as an evil, and stipulates the way in which it may be said to be analogous to ordinary, mundane evil. The question is then raised as to whether some of the answers available in response to mundane evil can be made fruitful in response to the evil of hell. After a discussion of the problem of hell construed as a logical and evidential problem of evil respectively, the author concludes that, recent suggestions notwithstanding, none of these answers can mutatis mutandis be applied to the evil of hell.

In psychology of religion, the importance of the human capacity for imagination is stressed by authors like P.W. Pruyser (1992, originally 1976) and B. Beit-Hallahmi (1989). Yet, a conceptual analysis of imagination, as a necessary foundation for empirical research, is missing. In this article, it is tried to clarify the concept of imagination with the help of the thought of J. Dewey – especially his psychology of art – for the benefit of research on the relationship between aesthetic and religious experiences.

The author analyses the role of feelings in the ethics of Kant. He comes to the conclusion that they are contradictory and miss psychological depth. One cannot have respect for duty in the Kantian sense and, at the same time, feel attracted to one’s fellow men. Respect for duty, as Kant describes it, is a psychological impossibility. Moreover duty cannot be an a priori experience because it depends on the fact that men are equal by nature. Kantian ethics are the result of philosophical presuppositions without taking account of the possibilities of human emotional life. They are dictated by his longing for absolute certainty.