2004
Volume 116, Issue 3
  • ISSN: 0002-5275
  • E-ISSN: 2352-1244

Samenvatting

Abstract

Human bodies are experiencing bodies that feel pain, pleasure and have a point of view. Our experiencing bodies are the natural starting point to develop a fully natural scientific account of our cognitive and experiential processes. However, accepting the experiential nature of our bodies is hampered by a long-standing pre-scientific conceptual dualism between mind and body. Nowadays, this dualism has been morphed into a modernlooking scientific version by the computer metaphor that interprets mind as abstracted, computational processes, while ignoring experience. In this paper, I will, first, sketch how experiencing bodies are a fact of life, second, discuss how the computer metaphor provides a conceptually dualistic and truncated interpretation of who we are, third, present three reasons why this conservative dualistic interpretation is problematical, and, fourth, argue that our experiencing bodies are straightforward natural phenomena that require a home in the general naturalistic perspective of the world.

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