NTT Journal for Theology and the Study of Religion - Volume 43, Issue 1, 1989

With regard to Ex. 34:29-35 two problems are discussed: 1. The meaning of qāran ‘ŵr pānâw/p^e nê mōšeh in 34:29, 30, 35. 2. The question of the relation of 34:29-33 to 34:34,35.

Ad 1.: The traditional interpretation: qrn = ‘to shine’, is considered to be the least debatable among the various interpretations. In the context of Exodus it presents the most adequate sense. By the radiance on his face Moses is legitimated as YHWH’s in-timate and representative.

Ad 2.: To 34:34, 35 the following tendency is attributed: YHWH’s precepts, given to Moses inside the sanctuary, have the same divine authority as the ordinances revealed on Mount Sinai (cf. 34:29-33). By the transfiguration of Moses’ face the divine origin of his words is guaranteed.

Most commentators think that the Scripture which is fulfilled in John 19:28 is Psalm 69:22. This is unlikely, however, because a. the text indicates that the Scripture is fulfilled in Jesus’ thirst; b. the gift of ‘water’ is no aggravation of Jesus’ sufferings; c. the context demands an intrinsic connection with Jesus’ death, which is laying down his life majestically. A better solution is possible once we recognize that the fulfillment of the Scripture deals, not with Jesus’ physical, but with his spiritual thirst, i.e. his wish to go to the Father. The Scripture which is quoted is Psalm 42:2-3 or Psalm 63:2.

In this article the problem is treated that arises when a systematic theologian uses descriptive material to base a prescriptive argument. By means of the example of the ecological debate it is argued that it is impossible to employ univocally factual data for a prescriptive statement no more than it is possible to select and interpret facts without prejudice. Only in a continuous complex hermeneutic process a relation between both is possible. This implies for the systematic theological researcher that he never is able to set up an unambiguous argument, but only can reach a certain level of plausibility, that depends on both his knowledge of the existing tradition and on the cogency of new evidence and his ability to integrate this into the tradition.

This article deals with some problems in Kuitert’s epistemology (in Wat heet geloven?). A confrontation of Kuitert with Popper’s critical rationalism and Polanyi’s post-criticism shows serious flaws in his ideas concerning the problem of experience and reality. Kuitert’s central concepts turn out to be unclear when put in the light of the discussion realism - conceptual relativism. A look at Kuitert’s conceptions of history and God confirms the impression of ambiguity. Here Kuitert seems to be floating between ideas of the radical Enlightenment (Popper) and a more expressivistic understanding of reality (Polanyi). Seperate attention is being paid to the notion of meaning.