NTT Journal for Theology and the Study of Religion - Volume 48, Issue 4, 1994

In this article it is argued – over against the communis opinio – that (Christian) freedom was not a conception of any importance in the Johannine communities. In John 8:31-36, the only passage in the Johannine writings where the terms έλενθεροῡν/έλεύθερος occur, they have been introduced only because of their ambiguity. A fine parallel is found in Epictetus, Dissertationes 4, 1, 7-10. In contrast to the claim of the Jews (or particular Jewish-Christian groups) of being sons of Abraham and consequently ‘free’ men, the author of John argues that they are ‘slaves’, and this implies that they do not belong to the house of Abraham any longer. The exegesis leads to a new interpretation of verse 35. ‘The house’ mentioned here does not refer to the house of God but to the house of Abraham. By not accepting unconditionally Jesus Christ as the Son of God Jesus’ discussion partners show, in the author’s opinion, that they have left their father’s house.

It is widely held that religious pluralism poses a problem for believers who are Christians. In the first section it is argued that the problem at hand emerges from truth claims which Christians make: Christians make truth claims that are contested by adherents of other religions. Section 2 discusses John Hick’s proposal to interpret religious truth claims in a Kantian way and argues that Hick’s position is self-referentially incoherent. Section 3 inquires whether it is true, as many claim, that Christian exclusivism (the view that what Christians believe is true and what is incompatible with it false) has to be rejected on moral grounds (exclusivism is thought to express arrogance, oppression, insensitivity, delinquincy etc.). It is being argued it has not. The final section offers an interpretation of J.H. Bavink’s and J. Verkuyl’s Calvinian theology of religions; it is argued that their theology is ontologically exclusivistic and soteriologically inclusivistic and that it is eminently sensible.

The development of Dutch religious education (RE) is described in the light of literature of the last decade. Current learning-teaching models are examined: a kerugmatic, an open and an intercultural model. These models are discussed in two ways: normative-culturally and educationally. In practice one is usually working in a less scientific way than is proposed here. School teachers may do so, but church education should not stay behind. The freedom to learn is at stake in our multicultural society. But an intercultural kind of RE has to bear in mind the stage of faith-development: a child can only understand his own tradition. Learning processes in the church become more and more ‘intergenerative’ and reciprocal: young people know our modern culture better while older people know religious traditions better. Though churches of course want to hand down their tradition, they should rather choose an open and intercultural RE, just like schools do.

In the so-called Enlightenment Project, the task of natural theology is to establish the truth of the proposition that God exists by deriving it from religiously neutral and universally compelling premises. In theology this project is rejected by the followers of Karl Barth and in philosophy of religion by the followers of Wittgenstein. The latter considers the claim that God exists to be a tacit presupposition which is constitutive for the religious form of life. As such its truth cannot be established apart from the form of life as is attempted in the Enlightenment Project. This Wittgensteinian critique of natural theology is defended against the charge of fideism and it is argued that Wittgenstein’s views on religion correspond to the Anselmian project of faith seeking understanding which is also defended by Karl Barth. Finally it is shown what this entails for the nature and limits of a dialogue between believers and sceptics.