Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte - Volume 107, Issue 1, 2015

Plato on eros

What is love for Plato, and why, after his analysis of eros in Symposium, did Plato take up the subject again, some ten years later, in Phaedrus? This article describes a transtition in Plato’s thinking about eros. In the Symposium, eros is a desire for immortality and a creative power, and it is is elicited by a beautiful person. In the homoerotic case, the lover’s soul is pregnant, and his eros produces the good in the form of poems, laws, philosophical ideas, and virtue. But the philosopher has to gradually outgrow his love for a beautiful body, and turn towards the realm of abstract ideas. In the Phaedrus, by contrast, the beauty of a boy can straightforwardly connect the philosopher to the divine, i.e., perfect and timeless reality. Here, the philosopher does not leave his love for the person behind. On the contrary, the friendship is forever, and it is the conversation between the friends that generates knowledge.

Reasons for love: why we can’t do otherwise than love what is lovable

Harry Frankfurt famously argues that loving someone is not done for reasons. While focusing on the (plausible) claims that parents need no reasons for loving their children and that it is absurd to ascribe a duty (or reason) to love X to someone who does not happen to love X, he overlooks an aspect of love that does connect it to reasons in a particular way: in daily conversation human beings spend enormous amounts of time and reflection to explaining and trying to understand love. I interpret the omnipresence of ‘love-talk’ as an indication of the nature of love in human beings: we love someone or something for reasons. Drawing on insights from the guise of the good-debate on the nature of desire, I argue that regardless of the infinite variety of things and persons that can be loved, the objects are all loved under the same form: the form of being lovable. The notion of a ‘lovability characterization’ entails a notion of ‘reasons’ that does not require reasons to be universalisable and that allows the loving-for-reasons view to avoid the fungibility-objection. In reply to the objection that the loving-for-reasons view makes love overly rationalistic, I point out that reason should not be understood as an external authority that commands us to do certain things, but as an internal power, integral to who we are, that shapes our conscious life, our mental attitudes and their objects.

Love and personal identity. Everyday loves, ambiguous selves

What we love matters for who we are. The idea may be self-evident, but how should it be understood exactly? One way is to conceptualize the formative influence of love on our identities in terms of ‘identification’: loving shapes who we are as we (volitionally) identify with the interests of the beloved and accept them as our own. Harry Frankfurt has fleshed out an influential identification-view along these lines. However, the identification-account is insufficiently able to accommodate the ambiguous nature of everyday loving and the way in which these ambiguities affect our identity. A second way in which the formative influence of love on our identity can be conceptualized is as ‘relation’: we are indeed shaped by what we love but the (affective-volitional) character of the relation in which we stand to our loved ones determines our identity. The latter view is capable to account for ambiguous loves and corresponding ambiguities in the self. Also, it gives prominence to the practical problem of loving, that is, to the question of how to relate to the people we love. It offers a more realistic perspective on that problem, as it takes the enduring differences between us and our beloveds into account, as well as the intersubjective character of loving. In sum: how we love what we love shapes who we are.

True Love Without Uniqueness: Good Reasons for Romantic Love

Love involves emotions, and emotions are things that happen to us. So how can love be true? Love can be true only if people can have reasons for loving someone. I explore the tension between these two thoughts and propose a way of resolving it. I argue that reasons for romantic love are not limited to the other person’s properties, not even when relational properties such as a common sense of humour are included. A full-blown romantic relation provides relation-dependent reasons that derive from the values that are realized within the relationship. These include trust, vulnerability and intimacy. True love is justified in part by such relation-dependent reasons. How this is consistent with the emotional dimension of love becomes clear once it is appreciated that people can have reasons for the emotions they experience. As this is not always recognized, the mystery of love is sometimes overrated. I end by discussing whether true love must be unique in the sense of being limited to one particular person. I argue that true love need not be combined with the norms of monogamy, but is consistent with those of polyamory.

Blindness in therapy? Love? Or science?

In this paper we dispute what seems an obvious truism these days: that increasing the influence of scientific research on psychotherapy is a good thing. We begin with an exploration of two distinct capacities that contribute in significant ways to human flourishing: knowledge and love. We then argue that modern society rather onesidedly capitalizes on the growth of scientific knowledge. This has an important drawback because the dominant model of growth presupposed in scientific research is built on the idea of reducing the potentially disturbing influence of the subjective engagement of the scientist with the object of knowledge. This is ordinarily quite a fruitful idea that has, however, paradoxically bad effects in evidence-based therapy. This is the case, we argue, because in a scientifically informed therapy the therapist should, in some sense, try to be blind to the effects of his expertise on his clients’ expectations of his expertise. A scientific, disengaged perspective therefore frustrates the therapist’s need to invest in the formation of a charitable relationship with his clients. Next we argue that the popular prejudice against love – that it is blind – is not as plausible as it is considered to be. To be sure, love invites cognition to accept a subservient role, but, we argue, this has some advantages too. It encourages the lover to discern particularly positive and promising features of the object of his love, and this, we argue, is crucial to a successful therapy in two ways. On the one hand, the therapist needs to engage with these positive and promising features to succeed in building the needed charitable relationship with his clients. And on the other hand clients often go into therapy because they lack access to their own positive and promising features and are therefore unable to entertain a charitable relationship with themselves. We conclude that with respect to psychotherapy there might be good reason for contemporary society to capitalize on the growth of love, rather than the growth of knowledge.