Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte - Volume 110, Issue 3, 2018

Abstract The person with dementia: A plea for a (non-metaphysical) relational notion of personhood In this article we explore the notions of personal identity and personhood, using concrete descriptions of the experiences of people living with dementia as a case study. From an analytical point of view we argue against memory or psychological-continuity criteria of personal identity as too cognitive. Instead we focus on em Read More

Abstract First-person authority, self-regulation and the problem of confabulation In this paper we discuss the implications of confabulation studies for the everyday concept of first-person authority. We argue that the results of these studies are less problematic than they are often taken to be if we understand first-person authority in terms of a capacity for self-regulation. We discuss an example of clinical confabuluation to illustr Read More

Abstract Neuromodulation and narrative identity: the importance of relational autonomy In this paper, I discuss the impact of psychological and relational changes after neuromodulation for movement- and psychiatric disorders and the need to adequately address the possibility of such changes in clinical contexts. Based on Focquaert and Schermer (2015), Goddard (2017) and Baylis (2013), I outline a relational narrative Read More

Abstract Plurality of concepts of identity, foundational identity, and dualism This paper defends three claims. One: the Dutch word for ‘identity’ (viz. ‘identiteit’) is used to express very different concepts, such as the concept of ‘character’, ‘self-image’, ‘social identity’, ‘narrative identity’, and ‘identity through time’. Two: each of these concepts is applicable to human persons, but the concept of ‘identity through time’ is, in a cr Read More

Abstract Identity as expression: Narrativity, embodiment, and intersectionality How to understand intersectional aspects of personal identity such as gender, race or ethnicity, sexual orientation, age and (dis)ability? In this paper, I argue that it requires a notion of personal identity as expression to do so. Most philosophical theories of personal identity do not take into account social, embodied factors such as the ones named above. Read More

Abstract The stories we live by: On narrative self-constitution and self-understanding In spite of what Galen Strawson defends, it is claimed that a narrative attitude – 
as a psychological fact – is of great use for self-reflective beings in making their experiences understandable and managing their lives. Secondly, there is doubt about the existence of what Marya Schechtman called a ‘narrative self’, i.e. a self that is constituted Read More