Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte - Volume 111, Issue 1, 2019

Non-combatant Immunity and Irregular Warfare

The Ethical Problem of Human Shields

One of the basic principles of the Just War Theory is that of non-combatant immunity. Basically, this principle is about protecting the civilian population against the violence of war. Now, despite the fact that this principle is firmly ingrained in our collective moral conscience and in international humanitarian law, the truth is that the civilian population has never been really insulated from the horrors of war. Quite on the contrary. This seems to be especially the case in so-called irregular warfare. In order to avoid military defeat against a stronger opponent, non-state armed movements very often use tactics that entail important risks for the civilian population. These irregular combatants hide and fight, for instance, among the civilian population or they intentionally blur the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. One of those tactics consists in using non-combatants as human shields. It goes without saying that this tactic presents a complex moral challenge for conventional troops. Should these human shields be treated like any other innocent bystanders, or should they be considered as partial combatants? And can the non-combatant immunity principle be of any moral assistance here? It is the objective of this article to shed more light on this issue. The argument will be developed in four stages. First, we will take a closer look at the principle of non-combatant immunity as it is understood within the Just War Theory. In order to see if and to what extent the principle of non-combatant immunity can be of any assistance in confronting human shields, we will conduct a first case-based analysis. Next, we aim to develop a moral continuum of paradigmatic cases of human shields, the purpose of which is to provide an instrument that will help us to formulate more nuanced moral appreciations. Finally, we will briefly look at the practical relevance of the proposed approach.

On ‘caritas’ and the promise of ‘right intent’

Back to the roots of justice in war

In classical Just War texts, the criterion of ‘right intent’ is considered a key concept with regard to the justice of a war as such, since it refers to the basic iustus disposition from which the other criteria (ad bellum as well as in bello and post bellum) should be applied. However, in current JW debates, determined to a large extent by Traditionalists and Revisionists, the importance of this key concept threatens to disappear from view. This article aims to show the relevance of further reflection on the role and meaning of the criterion of ‘right intent’ using classical JW insights and in particular Hannah Arendt’s analysis of Augustine’s concept of ‘caritas’, given the political relevance of this concept as pointed out by Arendt. The criterion of ‘right intent’ is closely connected to Arendt’s distinction between power and violence and her principle of the right to have rights. Right intent, as a virtue, based on and inspired by caritas, in more contemporary discourse, a humanitarian ethos, implies the promise of the iustus application of the JW criteria that were originally formulated precisely for that reason.

Enforcing Global Justice: War, Necessity and Rights of Armed Resistance of the World’s Poor

Global justice theorists have long focused on the nature and grounds of duties of the affluent to alleviate the plight of the global poor and to realize justice worldwide. The last few years has seen a flurry of work that shifts perspective to the agency and remedial rights of the global poor. Suppose due assistance is not forthcoming. Could this give the severely deprived a just cause to secure their basic rights by armed force? If so, under which conditions is it all-things-considered morally permissible for them to resort to violence? This article contrasts two possible ways of grounding and conceptualizing remedial rights of armed resistance against economic injustice. Some modern global justice-based accounts endow the global poor with limited rights to wage defensive war to force the affluent to comply with duties of global justice. The old right of necessity conditionally entitles the severely deprived to use armed force to secure access to privately-owned resources and spaces to meet urgent needs. While lethal force will on both accounts be seldom all-things-considered morally permissible in practice, my analysis reveals that the old right of necessity is, for better or worse, a more capacious ground for armed resistance than modern human rights of subsistence, as it sidesteps the issues of indeterminate and underdetermined moral liability.

The war in just war theory

Just war theory has an ancient pedigree. While the substantive norms and application of those norms have always been debated, the debate today is entirely polarized. So polarized, that there seems to be a ‘war’ raging in just war theory. On one side are representatives of Walzer’s conventional position and on the other side so-called revisionists as McMahan, Fabre, Rodin, and Frowe. This paper offers a critical analysis of that dichotomy. While most of the debate is focused on the substantive level (the norms itself), I focus here on the conceptual level (terminology and character of the positions) and meta-level (the underlying theoretical premises). My aim is threefold: to assist readers in understanding contemporary contributions to just war theory; to facilitate a truce between both camps by highlighting respective strengths and weaknesses and by exposing a certain division of labor; and to suggest improvements for both positions.

Ethics for Cyber War and Cyber Warriors

Although some claim that the term cyber war is merely metaphorical, there are good reasons to see cyber war as a form of warfare – even if it is not war as we have hitherto known it. This poses the question whether the principles of the Just War Tradition, which claims to offer an alternative for pacifism and realism, apply to this specific kind of war too. This article argues that the jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality are applicable, and that actually applying them would limit the harm cyber-attacks currently cause. Most cyber-attacks of recent years wrongly target civilians, and this amounts to a serious breach of these principles. The final part of this article looks at those who actually conduct the cyber-attacks, the cyber soldiers – how do they fit into the military profession, and to what extent can we expect them to uphold the principles of Just War?

Does the use of armed drones influence the chance of success in the fight against terrorism?

In this article we analyse whether armed drones influence the chance of success in the fight against terrorism. The reasonable chance of success principle is a just war theory principle, focusing on the likelihood of reaching the war objectives. Without a reasonable chance of winning the war, it is better not to start it. This principle will first be explained. Next, the focus lies on those elements that influence the chance of success in the fight against terrorism when armed drones are used. Success in the fight against terrorism might be a diminishing of the terrorist threat or the elimination of the terrorist organisation. The drone attacks in the fight against terrorism very often result in systematic collateral damage, which is detrimental to the objective, because it forms a breeding ground for terrorist organisations. One of the reasons for this collateral damage is systematic risk transfers, which will be explained in greater detail in the article. In the third part, the focus lies on other potentially positive elements that influence the chance of success, in order to compensate for the collateral damage. Unfortunately, there is no consensus in this research domain about the consequences for the terrorist organisation of killing a terrorist leader. Besides, research reveals that it is more productive to concentrate on political participation and on policing (law enforcement and arrest). The article calls not for a complete ban of armed drones; after all, collateral damage could already be limited if the risk transfers were to be limited. To limit these transfers, men on the ground are needed, in order to intervene when human shields are used. Agents on the ground are needed to collect human intelligence in order to have reliable and complete intelligence and to investigate the intentions, to see who is prepared to negotiate and who to surrender. It would be an illusion to think that there is a reasonable chance of success in this fight with a party that takes zero physical risks.

‘As in a view from afar’. Vondel’s epistemological objections to Spinoza’s circle

From a philosophical and theological stance, Spinoza and Vondel are traditionally portrayed as downright antipodes. Whereas Spinoza is seen as a pre-eminent representative of ‘radical Enlightenment’, Vondel is generally considered as a rather reactionary author who does not fit at all in this radical version of Enlightenment. The central aim of this article is to modify this generally agreed perception. On the basis of recent historical research in the relation between the circle of Spinoza and Vondel, the affinities between both authors can be brought to the fore, in particular when looking at their writings on the relation between politics and religion. The gap between their views becomes only apparent when their respective views of God are at stake: there is an undeniable contrast between Spinoza’s naturalist pantheism and Vondel’s classic theism. In order to understand that very difference, the focus will be laid on two writings, conceived in more or less the same period: Vondel’s philosophical-theological poem Bespieghelingen van Godt en Godsdienst and Spinoza’s Verhandeling over de verbetering van het verstand (Treatise on the Emendation of Understanding). The central difference between the two authors in these writings relates to their methodological approach of existential questions about God and salvation, in particular to their dissent concerning the epistemological role of the geometrical method and the specific role of language. One of the hypotheses I propound in this respect is that Vondel’s relation to Lodewijk Meyer has been of utmost importance in order to explain their different methodological positions. Finally, I indicate the topical relevance of this methodological difference for contemporary philosophical reflection.