Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte - Volume 112, Issue 3, 2020

Against the dominant trends of the scientification and naturalization of philosophy and the concurrent reduction of traditions of practical wisdom to private opinions, this article pleads for a revaluation of philosophy’s original relation with wisdom. It does so by shedding a philosophical light on several related aspects of wisdom through three different lenses. The first one, taken from Aristotle, explores the relation between theoretical and practical wisdom, leading to the conclusion that practical wisdom has to confront general moral principles with particular situations. The second lens, taken from Kant, argues that wisdom offers existential orientation, which requires the combination of an external and an internal moral principle. Yet, the external principle cannot be determined univocally because it is not empirically given. This lack of univocity raises the question of the fate of wisdom in our times, marked by a plurality of existential points of orientation. With the help of a third lens, stemming from Ricoeur, it will be argued that universal moral rules should be amendable to enrichment by ‘potential universals’ embedded in foreign cultures, thus creating a situation of reflexive equilibrium between theoretical and practical wisdom.

Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy pays little explicit attention to the concept of ‘wisdom’ in its taxonomy of the functions of human reason in its work of rendering intelligible the world and the human place in the world. On the basis of some crucial texts in Kant’s writings, this essay argues that wisdom has a role to play in the task Kant assigns to practical reason; this task is to make the world in which humans dwell intelligible morally, i.e., to make sense of the world as locus in which good and evil take form in function of the exercise of human freedom. In such a world, the function of wisdom is ‘cosmopolitan’ in that it provides a horizon of a social hope that recognizes human solidarity, vulnerability, and otherness, as signal instances of the inclusive moral relationality necessary for sustaining both an ‘outer’ world order for peace and the ‘inner’ dynamic of full moral relationality that Kant terms ‘the ethical commonwealth’.

In the present essay, wisdom is conceived as the basic knowledge that underpins all forms of humanising knowledge and the striving for justice. The idea of wisdom as indispensable to all human endeavours is one that can be found in the works of Plato and Cicero. In ancient writings, we also see that wisdom is traditionally opposed to hubris. Hence, following Gabriel Marcel, the quest for wisdom can be regarded as an antidote to practical anthropomorphism. Consequently, I argue that the quest for wisdom depends on an anti-hubris attitude, namely, piety or reverence. The fear of the gods, which is recommended by ancient poets and philosophers, is here considered as encouraging that piety and hence the love of wisdom. I distinguish between piety and traditionalism and show that the latter is hostile to awe and wisdom. I also briefly address the tension between traditions and philosophy and suggest that the dilemma can be resolved by critical alertness and by putting the insights of religious traditions on par with the wisdom of literature and poetry. The quest for wisdom, I argue, is fostered and hindered by particular cultural contexts. Ours today is more hostile to such quest.

This paper takes up some themes in Peter Jonkers’s essay, ‘Philosophy and Wisdom’, but discusses, more specifically, philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’. After a short summary of what is commonly understood by wisdom, why people value wisdom, and how one may acquire wisdom, I briefly note why the philosophy that we generally encounter today has seemed, to some, to be disconnected from wisdom and the love of wisdom. I argue that, if we are more attentive to the role of love in philosophy and to texts, frequently marginalized, that reflect a ‘sapiential philosophy’, philosophy can again be ‘love of wisdom’.

Securing a future for philosophy and wisdom in the professionalized and specialized context of twenty-first century academia is the challenge taken up by this article. If the conception of philosophy as the love of wisdom expects too much of philosophers, the construal of philosophy as the study of wisdom expects too little. To attempt to rehabilitate the relationship between philosophy and wisdom by claiming that philosophy is the study of wisdom unreasonably limits the scope of the current vibrant and expansive discipline, leaving it unclear how the more theoretical dimensions of philosophy might fit into it. Moreover, to exclude from consideration the possibility that a person might be improved by philosophy, and his or her life enhanced, is to denature the discipline. The model of philosophy as encouraging friendship with wisdom, on the other hand, does not underestimate philosophy’s potential for helping someone to become the kind of person who could make the choices likely to contribute to the living of a good life. By providing a way of thinking about the relationship between philosophy and wisdom that is appropriate to our age, the idea that philosophers are friends of wisdom can contribute to our evolving practice and understanding of the discipline, while at the same time allowing philosophy and philosophers to remain vitally connected to their heritage.

This article introduces the Chinese conception of wisdom by a focus mainly on the famous discussion in Mencius. It emphasizes that everything is a change, that changes toward wisdom are natural (or in the case of Xunzi, humane), and that people are always changing toward or away from what is wise. In contrast to much Western thought, wisdom is a response to external things, not to an internal marker. Moreover, it is nearly always a commentary on conjoint actions as in a game, or ritual. The essay continues some strands of Chinese thinking about wisdom through Xunzi and up to Zhu Xi. My position as a Westerner is commented on at the end.

This essay sketches some of the main characteristics of a perennial and cross-civilizational concept of wisdom. It argues that the latter is based upon a strong and deep sense of transcendence and upon the discernment that flows from it. This essay highlights the ways in which this discriminative wisdom does not amount to any form of dualism, but, on the contrary, leads its proponents and practitioners to an all-encompassing experience of anthropocosmic harmony and metaphysical unity. Taking stock of Asian wisdom traditions such as Advaita Vedānta and Zen Buddhism this paper also stresses the intimate connection between wisdom and objectivity; hence the ideal of a full attentiveness to reality in its irreducible suchness. Finally the essay broaches wisdom’s power of intellectual and spiritual displacement as a means of realizing the aforementioned objectivity. The final section discusses the circumstantial and ontological reasons for wisdom’s concealment, and the ways in which sagely expressions must be adjusted to a wide spectrum of human limitations.