Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte - Volume 114, Issue 3, 2022

Freedom and slavery. Hegel on habit

This article is an introduction to the Dutch translation of Hegel’s analysis of habit in paragraphs 409–410 of the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit, which is published in this issue. The analysis of habit is placed in context through a discussion of the preceding paragraphs, which describe how human consciousness detaches itself from its immersion in nature and consider the relation between habit and madness. This is followed by a discussion of the ambiguous nature of habit, which according to Hegel is both necessary for thinking and freedom but at the same time leads us to act mechanically and without thinking and thus turns us into slaves of habit. The final section argues that the problematic, ‘enslaving’ aspect of habit is not a passing phase that is overcome at higher levels of development, as Hegel sometimes seems to suggest. Both Hegel’s theory of ethical life and the modern state as ‘second nature’ as well as the ‘pure thought’ of philosophy remain rooted in habit and can therefore not be detached from the dark side of habit, which threatens the rationality and integrity of modern ethical life and philosophy.

Difference and Habit: Deleuze anti-Hegelian critique of consciousness

Since Antiquity, habit has been understood as a second nature, as something that we develop in a conscious or unconscious way, and which directs and structures both our cognitive and practical lives – our consciousness and our actions. For Hegel, habit effectuates the transition from nature to spirit or consciousness, thus forming the basis of morality. Habit thus constitutes an essential stage in the development of the mind and a crucial aspect of Hegel’s philosophical anthropology. Habit also plays a crucial role in the thinking of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who characterizes his philosophical project as anti-Hegelian or anti-dialectical. Even though many works examine the relationship between Deleuze and Hegel, almost none of these discuss the concept of habit of these authors, and the role that it plays in Deleuze’s so-called anti-Hegelianism.

In this article, I address the concept of habit in Difference and Repetition, and the role it plays in Deleuze’s critique of Hegel. I also compare this concept with Hegel’s own conception of habit in his Anthropology. I show that Deleuze certainly does not understand repetition as second nature as Hegel does, because then it is impossible to account for the productive power of the unconscious or the sub-representative, and of real creativity. I distinguish my interpretation of habit in Deleuze from that of a number of other authors, who, in my view, do not draw all the conclusions from Deleuze’s interpretation of Hume. I then expound Deleuze’s original notion of habit and compare it with Hegel’s.

A future without habit: Lewis Mumford

This article discusses the relevance of historian of technology Lewis Mumford (1895-1990) for a philosophy of habit. Although Mumford is not traditionally interpreted as a philosopher of habit, the aim of the article is to show that Mumford’s approach to biotechnics contains (i) an anthropology in which habit, rather than technology, is of decisive importance in human history; (ii) an original interpretation of habit which differs from both the classical Aristotelian approach, as well as from a modernist approach like that of Hegel; (iii) a non-materialist interpretation of work, which problematizes the recent emergence of flexible work as a problem of habit, allowing for an original evaluation of the problem of precarization. What is at stake here is a re-evaluation of the relation between habit and psychopathology, in light of which Mumford shows that modern work tends to destabilize millennia-old habits, prompting the question of how these habits might be sustained.

Thinking out of habit: an embodied perspective

In the second half of the twentieth century, habit had received little attention in the cognitive sciences and philosophy of cognition. This despite the extensive theoretical attention habit received in phenomenology and pragmatism. This is because due to influence of behaviorism and the cognitivist revolution, habit was reduced to mechanical stimulus-response reaction that is learned through drill and repetition, and therefore habit cannot be considered intelligent. In this article I argue that a richer and more accurate notion of habit is possible through an embodied vision of cognition, namely enactivism and ecological psychology. This means that we can consider habit as intelligent without equating habit with reflective thought. Such a notion is possible because both enactivism and ecological psychology have their conceptual roots in pragmatism and phenomenology. Secondly, an embodied vison of cognition can describe how our habits are formed from sensorimotor contingencies and are self-organizing patterns of behavior in interaction with an environment. This can be described through the metaphor of ‘laying down a path’, whereby taking a shortcut across a field of grass a path is formed, which enables walking across the field of grass. Laying down a path is more than a metaphor, but also an example of the sociomaterial dimension of habit. Habits are always formed in an interaction between an organism and an environment that is, in our case both material and social.

A phenomenological account of the habitual and active character of ignorance

A number of critical social epistemologists have argued that a form of ignorance makes up the epistemic dimension of existing relations of oppression based on racial and/or gender identity. Recent phenomenological accounts of the habitual nature of perception can be understood as describing the bodily, tacit, and affective character of this form of ignorance. At the same time, as I aim to show in this article, more could be phenomenologically said and made of both the active and pervasive character of said ignorance. Drawing on the phenomenological concept of receptivity, I propose a way to further understand the active character of ignorance both in and beyond perception. By doing so, we also get a better view on what it would take to overcome this kind of ignorance.

Cis and transgender. Performativity as bodily and social habit

In this article, I argue that habit formation provides a good starting point to understand gender identity. Judith Butler’s concept of ‘performativity’ indicates that gender identity comes about through a process of social and linguistic repetition of normative representations of gender. The phenomenological notion of ‘habitual identity’ that Maren Wehrle (2021) suggests, complements this notion of performativity, but should be complemented with a psychic aspect to attain a completer notion of performativity. Understanding performativity in terms of habit formation seemingly also has a downside: does it not lead to repetition of the same in an environment of predominantly cis and binary gender identities? What does this mean now that more and more people identify as trans or non-binary? I argue that performativity does not necessarily involve the reproduction of cis and binary gender identities, because it includes the possibility of variation from the norm. While cis implies that body, identity and social ascriptions coincide, in the case of trans there are discontinuities between these three. Rather than considering cis and trans as opposites, performativity means understanding both as variations, of which the discontinuities between body, self and social ascriptions are more difficult to live.