Filosofie & Praktijk - Volume 44, Issue 3/4, 2023

The Introduction to this special issue on civil disobedience presents an overview of the Dutch philosophical debate from the 1970s to the present. A disobedient citizen typically acts against the law while recognizing the legitimacy of the democratic legal order as a whole, in order to challenge a specific legal injustice. Rawls’ liberal model is the default view. Radical critics relax Rawls’ strict requirements for disobedient actions and shift the focus of the fight for justice from individual liberty to social equality. In political practice, the response of the Dutch authorities is not very tolerant. The Introduction concludes with an overview of the essays, many of which focus on the climate crisis.

Climate activists point out that the voices of those who suffer from it now and in the future are not or hardly heard. In order to comply, they often consciously opt for civil disobedience, since legal protests, such as petitions and demonstrations, hardly move citizens and politicians. This article focuses on the efforts being made to address the climate catastrophe through civil disobedience. While climate activists view civil disobedience as a legitimate way of resistance, its legitimacy is disputed by many. The recent resistance to climate catastrophe is then placed in the light of the philosophical controversy about civil disobedience. Beyond the liberal vision of civil disobedience, a vision is presented that does more justice to political practice, taking into account the tension between legality and legitimacy. Finally, the question is raised whether civil disobedience is not indispensable for revitalizing a political practice that pretends to take human rights and democracy seriously.

In this article¹, I argue for a more expansive approach to civil disobedience that allows for climate justice issues to be connected to the existing literature on the subject. The first argument appeals to the ideals of a deliberative conception of democracy. I argue that in many states, the deliberative process has been unduly influenced by fossil fuel interests and that civil disobedience may be a morally permissible way to restore the integrity of collective decision-making procedures. Next, I argue that the prospect of suffering irreversible harms provides citizens with the grounds to use disruptive, illegal tactics to contest the governance relationships that impose these harms. Finally, I argue that a minimal commitment to intergenerational justice offers a compelling reason for using civil disobedience in order to safeguard democratic institutions for future generations.

In the light of climate change, the problem of civil disobedience arises in a new way. In discussion with the heuristics of fear of Hans Jonas and a seminal article of Hannah Arendt on civil disobedience the positions of Socrates and Thoreau are examined. Central themes are: the tension between a moral and a political attitude, public versus private action, the question of violence and peacefulness.

This article examines the strained relationship between climate activism in the form of civil disobedience and the democratic governments it intends to hold accountable. Climate activism often involves lawbreaking to draw attention to the looming climate crisis. Yet, in a democracy there are institutions and procedures that ensure democratic participation, on the basis of which some question the validity of such civil disobedience. Particularly because democratic government is typically understood to be representing ‘the people’ and ‘the common good’. From a constructivist perspective on political representation, this article argues that there are valuable political representatives that operate outside the currently established formal institutions of representation. In defense of climate activism it thus holds that protests of civil disobedience are also capable of representing pressing political issues and demands, and even that they are sometimes better able to do so than parliamentary politics.

This contribution discusses the possibilities and limitations of two types of protest: civil disobedience and public shaming. Civil disobedience is characterized by peaceful resistance, whereby activists refuse to obey the law. Public shaming, on the other hand, is a symbolic means of criticism that communicates rejection and condemnation, with a stigmatizing or educational purpose. The two types of actions can be understood as ‘weapons of the weak’ with which social pressure can be exerted on mega-corporate organizations – in particular those of Big Oil – that persistently cause damage and avoid responsibility for it. Both forms of action raise specific moral questions and justifications for them are subject to a number of (strict) conditions. It is argued that Extinction Rebellion’s apolitical strategy is flawed in some respects and that a focus on campaigning against powerful companies – including shaming – may be more rewarding.